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REEFS IN CRISIS: A LOOK AT THE CHRONIC
DESTRUCTION CAUSED BY SHIPS
Amber S. Ward
I. INTRODUCTION
Within the world's oceans, the greatest diversity of life is found on coral
reefs. Often called "the rainforests of the sea," these amazing living
structures play a crucial role in sustaining a thriving ocean habitat, particu-
larly in tropical areas.' Although coral reefs comprise less than one percent
of the ocean floor, nearly twenty-five percent of all marine life are dependent
upon coral reefs for their survival. The many benefits which the reefs offer
include food production, coastal protection and immense biodiversity.2
Unfortunately, it is believed that ten percent of the world's coral reefs have
sustained irreversible damage.3 Over the past two decades, the coral reefs
around the world have experienced dramatic change, especially those in the
Florida Keys and the Caribbean.
In an effort to raise the world's awareness of the threats to coral reefs,
more than one hundred governments, nongovernmental organizations,
multilateral lending institutions, regional organizations, and United Nations
affiliates declared 1997 the Year of the Coral Reef.4 Coral reefs continue to
degrade in response to natural disturbances such as hurricanes, coral
bleaching and disease, and human activity, including: reef-destructive
fishing, sedimentation from deforestation and development, raw sewage,
nutrients and pesticides from agricultural practices, oil from ships and land-
based sources, and direct damage from tourism activities, boat anchors, and
ship groundings.5
* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 1999.
1. See Ocean Research Group, CoralReefs: Rainforests ofthe Sea (visited Jan. 25, 1998)
<http://www.mdc.net/-jbird/crrainspt.html>. Coral reefs are the oldest complex ecosystems
existing on Earth. See id.
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See Nancy Nelson, Land and Resource Management .I Sustainable Development,
COLO. J. INT'L. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 59 (1996).
5. Pacific Islands Report (on-line), Pacific Islands Development Program/Center for
Pacific Islands Studies, Plight Of Pacific Coral Reefs A Threat To U.S. Fisheries (visited
April 25, 1998) <http:/pidp.ewe.hawaii.edu/PlReportlAugust%201997/08-27-03.html>.
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Ship groundings are one of the most destructive anthropogenic factors,
causing substantial localized damage to coral reefs.6 Throughout the 500-
year history of mariners in the New World, thousands of shipwrecks have
been documented, including many groundings on coral reefs. In the 1850s,
the United States government was concerned about the number of ships
running aground on coral reefs off the coast of Florida, so a famous Harvard
biologist, L. Agassiz, was given the task of determining what, if anything,
the government could do in order to "get rid of" the reefs. Wisely, Agassiz
concluded that the reefs were in fact permanent structures and recommended
that lighthouses be built to protect shipping activities.7
One of the most avoidable disturbances is the cumulative damage caused
by ships. In U.S. waters alone, millions of gallons of oil have been spilled
by ships since 1989.' Immediate cleanups typically yield recovery rates that
range from ten percent to fifteen percent.9 Residual oil and the cleanup
techniques themselves effect hundreds of miles of shoreline and damage an
inestimable amount of natural resources. The spills and subsequent damage
to the marine environment that result during the transportation of oil offer
impetus and insight to our monetary valuation of nature.
To address the degradation of the Nation's natural resources, Congress
and the President have enacted a suite of environmental laws. Explicit
statutory authority to restore injured resources commenced with the Clean
Water Act (CWA) amendments of 1977 and continued with the enactment
of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act (CERCLA), the National Marine Sanctuaries Act (NMSA), and the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA). As the primary federal trustee for coastal and
marine resources, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association
(NOAA) is responsible for ensuring the restoration of resources injured by
releases of hazardous materials and of national marine sanctuary resources
injured by physical impacts. The CWA, CERCLA and OPA mandate that
parties who release, destroy, cause the loss of, or injure sanctuary resources
Natural stresses are not as widespread or as consistently threatening to reefs as
anthropogencis disturbances [hereinafter Pacific Islands Report]. See Oceanic Research
Group, supra note 1.
6. See William F. Precht, The Art and Science ofReefRestoration, GEOTIMES, Jan. 1998,
at 16 [hereinafter GEOTIMES].
7. See State of the Coastal Environment: The Extent and Condition of U.S. Coral Reefs,
(citing Halley, et. al. 1997) (visited May 1, 1998) <http://state of coast.noaa.gov/bulletin/
html/crf 08/intro.html>.
8. Petroleum products are a major marine pollutant, with approximately 3.25 million
metric tons entering the marine environment every year. See GLOBAL MARINE BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY: A STRATEGY FOR BUILDING CONSERVATION INTO DECISION MAKING 199 (Elliot
A. Norse ed., 1993).
9. U.S. Coast Guard, T/VJULIE N Spill <http://www.gwi.net/-msoport/julien.htm>.
are responsible for their restoration. The NMSA mandates that parties who
spill hazardous materials or oil into the marine environment are responsible
for both cleanup and restoration costs.
The valuation of natural resources allows the courts to assess damages
for environmental harm, resulting in the use of economic models to protect
the environment. The natural resource damage provisions of current relevant
statutes reflect a novel "hybrid" of economic theory, tort, trust, and
administrative law elements. Because the valuation methods of claims
brought under the public trust doctrine are essentially similar to the statutory
damage provisions, the discussion of commonlaw theories is limited to the
public trust doctrine, though several other common law theories have been
asserted in a post-spill claim. This Comment will consider the evolving role
of nonuse and contingent valuation, and the progression away from an
economic pricing theory of the valuation of Nature toward a recognition of
the intrinsic value of Nature.
The Fifth Circuit's 1970 decision in United States v. Ray recognized the
Government's "vital interest ... in preserving the reefs for public use and
enjoyment," and declared that "protective action by the Government to
prevent despoliation of these unique natural resources is of tantamount
importance."' The U.S. government's current position toward reefs and
marine ecology is evident in the designation of the several National Marine
Sanctuaries, and the participation in the International Coral Reefs Initiative.
In Agenda 21 of the International Coral Reef Initiative (ICRI), marine
ecosystems, including coral reefs, were accorded prominent status."
Increasing public and political recognition of the need to protect coral reefs
has been the major impetus for nations to preserve reefs.' 2 The IRCI
objectives call for a strengthened commitment to and implementation of
programs to conserve, restore and promote sustainable use of coral reefs, as
10. United States v. Ray, 423 F. 2d 16, 22-23 (5th Cir. 1970).
11. See International Coral Reef Initiative, Report to the United Nations Commission
on Sustainable Development, NOAA Web Site (visited Mar. 8, 1998) <http://www.
nos.noaa.gov/icri/csd/whole.html>. Adopted at the 1992 United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, Article 21 declares that states
should:
[I]dentify marine ecosystems exhibiting high levels ofbiodiversity andproductivity and
other critical habitat areas and should provide necessary limitations on use of these
areas, through, inter alia, designation of protected areas. Priority should be accorded,
as appropriate, to: (a) Coral reef ecosystems; (b) Estuaries; (c) Temperate and tropic
wetlands...; (d) Seagrass beds; (e) Other spawning and nursery areas.
See id.
12. See id.
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well as an increased capacity for development and implementation of
policies, management, research, and monitoring of reefs. 3
II. CORAL REEFS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
The United States implemented a comprehensive management plan for
its coral reef resources that includes marine reserves and special preserva-
tion areas within the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary (FKNMS).
The only emergent coral reefs found off the continental U.S. are located in
the Florida Keys, from south of Miami to the Dry Tortugas. Stretching 360
square kilometers, they are part of the world's third largest barrier reef
system. The Florida reef tract is the northernmost extension of the
Caribbean reef system. The lack of long-term monitoring programs makes
it difficult to generalize about the condition of coral reefs in the United
States. Large-scale preliminary assessments are currently underway:
experts, however, are uncertain about whether or not the assessments can be
maintained long enough to provide scientists and managers with enough data
to evaluate the status and trends of reefs. According to a report by NOAA,
"it is clear that degradation has outpaced our comprehension of the problems
at many locations.""
The principle Hawaiian Islands contain a large area of coral reefs,
situated in federal waters. A recent review of the health of Hawaii's reefs
determined that ninety percent of the reefs in the principle Hawaii Islands are
healthy. Located approximately 3,700 miles west-southwesterly of Honolulu
lies the U.S. territory of Guam, the southernmost island of the Mariana
Islands archipelago. Nearly all of the reefs surrounding Guam are overfished
and degraded as a result of human disturbances. One hundred miles
northeast of Guam, the well-developed reefs fringing the Northern Mariana
Islands are also currently under federal jurisdiction.
The only U.S. territory south of the equator, the five volcanic islands of
American Samoa are surrounded by fringing reefs that are partially exposed
at low tide. The reefs in the densely populated Pago Pago Harbor are
degraded as a result of increased land-based sedimentation, oil spills and
dredging activities. Two coral atolls are also found within the territorial
waters. Rose Atoll, which is protected as a National Wildlife Refuge, is one
of the world's most isolated and pristine atolls. Proof that shipwrecks can
occur anywhere, the atoll suffered substantial physical and chemical damage
in 1993 when a ship ran aground, spilling over 100,000 gallons of diesel oil.
13. See id.
14. See id.
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Another federally protected area is the Fagatele Bay National Marine
Sanctuary, which is home to nearly 200 species of coral.
In 1992, the coral reefs found over 100 miles south of the Texas-
Louisiana border were designated as the Flower Garden Banks National
Marine Sanctuary. 5 This reef community has been monitored for over 25
years, and has shown no significant declines during that time. This is
attributable, in part, to strict regulation of anchoring and offshore oil
development activities. However, the pristine condition of the reefs attracts
an increasing number of divers, with over 10,000 dives made annually.
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is comprised of six main islands.
On the largest island, which has a 500 kilometer coastline, runoff and
flooding from rivers create sediment problems for the reefs fringing the
island. Reefs within the Jobos Bay National Estuarine Research Reserve,
located off La Parguera, are in poor condition as a result of coastal erosion
and sewage disposal. Most reefs are located outside the reserve. They also
suffer from nutrient and sediment overload and are already overfished.
Forty-five miles east of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands are
surrounded by various types ofreefs. Over the last two decades, the amount
of living coral has declined and algal levels have risen. While natural
disturbances such as hurricanes and coral disease produced the greatest
damage to the reefs, sedimentation from runoff and overfishing continue to
contribute to the decline of the reefs. In St. Croix, protected areas include
Buck Island Reef National Monument and Salt River Submarine Canyon. 6
Three small marine reserves and wildlife sanctuaries lie off the coast of St.
Thomas, and in St. John, the Virgin Islands National Park and Biosphere
Reserve encompass two-thirds of the island. Overfishing and white band
disease have caused the greatest damage to the reefs in the Virgin Islands.
A. Threat to U.S. Fisheries
The continued degradation of reefs in the Pacific Islands region poses a
significant problem for the nation's fishing industry, threatening annual
financial losses in the hundreds of millions of dollars." The world's coral
reefs provide approximately ten percent of global fisheries and feed
hundreds of thousands of people in developing countries." In the United
15. The protected area encompasses fifty-six square miles.
16. Established in 1961 and 1992, respectively. In 1979 two major hurricanes caused
substantial damage to the reefs at Buck Island, and white band disease reduced the amount
of live elkhom coral cover from 85 percent to five percent.
17. See Pacific Islands Report, supra note 5.
18. See Nelson, supra note 4, at 59.
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States, federally managed fish species that are dependent on coral reefs are
worth close to $75 million to [fishermen], not including value of recreational
fisheries, state-managed reef-dependent fisheries, or the value added to
seafood products prior to reaching customers.'9 Approximately 500 federally
managed species of marine fish and invertebrates depend on coral reefs
during part of their life cycle."0 Without healthy corals, experts are
concerned that many commercial species, such as red snapper, grouper,
amberjack, and spiny lobster, may not survive.21
III. RECOVERY FOR REEF DAMAGES RESULTING FROM OIL SPILLS
A. The Public Trust Doctrine
"It is the clear duty of Government, which is the trustee for unborn
generations as well as for its present citizens, to watch over, and if need be,
by legislative enactment, to defend, the exhaustible natural resources of the
country from rash and reckless spoilation."2
The evolution of the public trust doctrine has been colorful and layered.
Its theoretical foundations have long historical roots and have been
influenced by a number of cultures. Finding validity in these related historic
legal concepts, our nation's jurisprudence has used them to determine which
characteristics of nature should be compensable. Early courts have
recognized that tidal waters and associated shoreline (other natural resources
included) are valuable common use resources requiring protection as a
public trust.2 3 In the United States, the creation of federal statutes and the
concept of federalism have further layered the body of the doctrine. Both
19. Pacific Islands Report (on-line), Pacific Islands Development Program/Center for
Pacific Islands Studies, International Year of the Coral Reef 1997 (visited May 2, 1998)
<http://www.suite101.com/articles/article.cfm/3067>.
20. Mele Laumano Petelo, Plight Of Pacific Coral Reefs A Threat To U.S. Fisheries
(visited April 25, 1998) <http://pidp.ewc.hawaii.edu/PIReport/1997/August/08-27-03.html>.
21. See id.
22. Ronald M. Pierce, Valuing The Environment: NOAA 's New Regulations Under The
Oil Pollution Act Of 1990, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 167, 212 (1994) (quoting A.C. Pigou).
23. Our concept of natural resources as the subject matter of a trust has its origins in
Justinian law and subsequent British law. The law guiding the Roman Empire implicitly
denied an intrinsic value of nature sufficient to afford it legal protections. Instead nature was
recognized as a resource to humans because of its ability to serve the public. In England, a
similar doctrine developed that protected the public's right to natural resources for a variety
of uses, for example, fishing and navigation. Though the proprietary title may have been held
by the king, the property in question was said to be subject to the public's right of entry. See
Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894);
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
state and federal court opinions have influenced the doctrine of public trust.
The origination of federal statutes and the multiplicity of opinions create
varying notions of responsibilities and rights, often expanding the traditional
substantive reach of the doctrine.
A state or federal trustee may sue in its proprietary capacity to recover
for damages to public resources. The scope of recovery includes not only
damages to lands beneath waters and beaches, but also damages sustained
by living resources. The public trust doctrine is of particular importance in
the context of marine pollution claims because the doctrine traditionally
applies to the navigable waters, submerged lands, and tidelands.
Three federal environmental statutes currently provide the basis for
trustees to recover natural resource damages: CWA,24 CERCLA,z and
OPA The natural resource assessment regulations promulgated pursuant
to these statutes are critical to achieving the goals of the statutes. All three
statutes authorize public trustees to seek to recover natural resource damages
from those parties responsible for causing injury to the natural resource.
24. Clean Water Act of 1977,33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(4) (1994). Section 311 of the CWA
declares that "there should be no discharges of oil or hazardous substances into or upon the
navigable waters of the United States, adjoining shorelines, or into or upon the waters of the
contiguous zone, or in connection with activities under the Outer Continental Shelf Land Act,
43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1994), or the Deep Water Port Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-
1524 (1994), or which may affect natural resources belonging to, appertaining to, or under
the exclusive management authority of the United States..." 33 U.S.C. §1321(b)(1).
25. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
26. Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 2706-2761 (1994). OPA's
provisions largely replace the liability created in the CWA pertaining to oil spills. However,
the CWA is still important in the field of natural resource damages. See Judith Robinson, The
Role of Nonuse Values in Natural Resource Damages: Past, Present, and Future, 75 TEX.
L. REV. 189 n.3 (1996) [hereinafter Robinson].
27. Congress has given legislative recognition to the public trust doctrine by designating
governmental officials as "trustees" for the natural resources. The President is required to
designate and authorize federal officials to act on behalf of the public as trustees for natural
resources. Under the CWA, federal and state official are authorized to serve as natural
resource trustees. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(5). In addition, CERCLA also recognized Indian
tribal trustees. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f). OPA adds heads of foreign governments to the list.
See 33 U.S.C. § 2706(b). The Secretary of Commerce is directed to act as trustee for those
resources that are found in navigable waters, waters influenced by the tide, waters of the
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone, and the outer continental shelf. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.600(b)(1). These natural resources are primarily managed by the Department of
Commerce. Resources that fall under the Secretary's trusteeship include marine fishery
resources. The Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of the Interior have concurrent
trusteeship of endangered species and marine mammals, anadromous fish, and their
respective ecosystems. See id. They are expected to coordinate their trustee responsibilities.
See id.
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Typically, in a spill situation under either OPA or CERCLA, federal and
state officials acting as trustees for natural resources work with those parties
who are responsible for injuring the natural resources to restore the resources
to their normal conditions. Both statutes authorize the trustees to recover
damages from the responsible parties for any interim and permanent loss of
the natural resource. The trustees must first assess the damages incurred as
a result of the spill or discharge incident. A natural resource damage
assessment is the administrative procedure through which the trustees are
able to arrive at an estimated damage figure. Natural resource damages are
defined as monetary compensation "for injury to, destruction of, or loss of
natural resources" that is not remedied by the immediate containment and
cleanup efforts following a spill or discharge of oil or hazardous substance.28
When Congress enacted OPA in 1990, it used CERCLA as a template.
In general, Congress intended OPA to provide liability and damage recovery
for oil pollution where CERCLA did not. Notwithstanding the distinction,
both OPA and CERCLA overlap the public trust doctrine, extending it
significantly. Because OPA provides a broader statutory basis than the
public trust doctrine for recovery of natural resource damages, future natural
resource damages claims will probably be based on federal statutes.
Senate hearings, law review commentators, and the statutes themselves
demonstrate the interplay between the public trust doctrine and federal
environmental statutes. For example, the original Senate CERCLA bill
states that the purpose of natural resource liability is to "preserve the public
trust in the Nation's natural resources." 9 CERCLA was not intended to limit
preservation of the Nation's natural resources only to preservation of fishing,
fowling, and navigational uses of natural resources, as envisioned by the
traditional definition of the public trust doctrine. Also, many commentators
have promoted the argument that these federal statutes, OPA included, build
upon and extend the public trust doctrine to include natural resources on the
whole rather than just for traditional uses.3"
28. 42 U.S.C.§ 9607(a)(4)(c); see alsoNatural Resource Damage Assessments (DOI),
43 C.F.R. § 11.14; see 15 C.F.R. § 990.30 (1999).
29. S. REP. No. 96-848, at 84 (1980).
30. See Duane Woodward & Michael Hope, Natural Resource Damage Litigation Under
the Comprehensive Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv.
189, 190 (1990) (stating that CERCLA natural resource damage provisions build upon the
traditional approaches to natural resource damages in the common law); Howard Kenninson
et al., State Actions for Natural Resource Damages, 17 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.)
10,434, 10,436 (Nov. 1987) (observing that CERCLA extends the public trust obligation
beyond the protection of soils, navigable waters, parks, and wild animals, to all public natural
resources). See also Terry Fox, Natural Resources Damages: The New Frontier of
Environmental Litigation, 34 S. TEX. L. REv. 521-23 & n. 13 (1993).
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NOAA is the principal Federal trustee for natural resources in the coastal
and marine environment.3" The natural resources of which NOAA is trustee
include: sediment and water quality, anadramous fish species, fishery
resources (commercial and recreational), threatened and endangered marine
species and their habitats, marine mammals, coastal habitats, such as
mangroves, sea grass beds and coral reefs, and all resources associated with
National Marine Sanctuaries and National Estuarine Research Reserves,
including coral reefs and sea grasses.32 In this role, NOAA evaluates injuries
resulting from the release of oil and hazardous substances, as well as
damages incurred in National Marine Sanctuaries' resources. NOAA's
ultimate goal is to restore injured coastal and marine resources.
The CWA, CERCLA and OPA mandate that parties causing injury to
natural resources are responsible for restoring any such injury and for the
cost of cleaning up the release. The NMSA mandated that parties who
destroy, cause the loss of, or injure sanctuary resources are responsible for
restoration. Wherepossible, NOAA negotiates cooperative settlements with
the parties responsible for injuring natural resources in order to reduce or
avoid litigation.33
B. The Clean Water Act
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 provided that the
United States could recover, up to certain limits, the costs it incurred in
cleaning up an oil spill, but made no explicit reference to natural resource
damages. The Clean Water Act Amendments of 1977 significantly
expanded liability for oil discharges and releases of hazardous substances.34
The CWA specifically authorized the federal government and the states, as
trustees, to recover damages for injuries to natural resources and to use those
funds for restoration efforts. 35 The CWA was the first piece of environmen-
tal legislation to depart from the strict common law damage theory and
codify the idea that parties responsible for injuring natural resources should
compensate the public for environmental damages. It was also the first
federal statute to expressly provide for recovery of natural resource
damages.36
31. About DARP, NOAA's web site for the Damage Assessment and Restoration
Program (DARP) <http:llwww-orea.nos.noaa.gov/darp/about.htm>.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1354 (1994).
35. See id. § 1321(f)(5).
36. See Robinson, supra note 26, at 196.
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The statute specifically states that the measure of damages shall include
the cost of "restoration or replacement of natural resources damaged or
destroyed. 37 The statute further requires that all costs recovered be used to
"restore, rehabilitate, or acquire the equivalent" of the injured resource.38
This reflects Congress's preference for restoration, as well as a concern that
market valuation does not account for nonuse values and therefore fails to
fully measure the value of an injured resource.39
1. The S.S. Zoe Colocotroni
In the landmark case of Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, the court
was called upon to determine the appropriate measure of damages for injury
to a coral reef.4" In March 1973, the oil tanker ran aground on a reef off the
southern coast of Puerto Rico, releasing more than 5,000 tons of crude oil
into the surrounding waters.4' The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and its
Environmental Quality Board instituted a suit against the vessel owners and
underwriter, seeking damages for cleanup costs and environmental harm in
the amount of $7,735,863 for removal and replacement of oil-contaminated
sediment and mangroves, and $5,526,583 to replace the organisms killed by
the spill.42  Although the court reject the first figure as "impractical,
inordinately expensive, and unjustifiably dangerous to the healthy man-
groves and marine animals still present in the area to be restored," it did
accept the second figure.43
The First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the appropriate standard for
determining environmental damages is "the cost reasonably to be incurred
by the sovereign or its designated agency to restore or rehabilitate the
environment in the affected areas to [its] preexisting condition, or as close
37. 33 U.S.C. §1321(0(4).
38. Id. § 1321(0(5).
39. See Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. REv. 269,
307-308 (1989).
40. See Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980). The
applicable law was the natural resource damage provision of a Puerto Rico statute similar to
the CWA. See id. at 673.
41. Seeid.at656.
42. See id. This latter amount was calculated on the basis of the net difference in the
number of organisms per square meter in the affected area and the number found in a
comparable control area, using average replacement costs. See id. at 660-61.
43. Id. at 676. The court also stated: "There may be circumstances where direct
restoration of the affected area is either physically impossible or so disproportionately
expensive that it would not be reasonable to undertake such a remedy. Some other measure
of damages might be reasonable in such cases." Id. at 675-76.
thereto as is feasible without grossly disproportionate expenditures."
Nevertheless, the court found that the district court had improperly exercised
its discretion in "permitting the state to recover money damages for the loss
of small, commercially valueless creatures which assuredly would perish if
returned to the oil-soaked sands, yet probably would replenish themselves
naturally if and when restoration - either artificial or natural - tookplace. '
C. The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act
Problems arose concerningjurisdiction and imposition of liability under
the common law and prior statutory frameworks, proving the CWA
inadequate to address the expanding problem of natural resource injury."
These insufficiencies lead to the proposal of CERCLA.47 In 1980, CERCLA
extended liability of responsible parties to include damages for several forms
of injury to natural resources caused by discharge of oil or release of
hazardous substances.48 It provides for recovery of "damages for injury to,
destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of
assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release. '
On August 28, 1996, President Clinton issued Executive Order 13016,
allowing Federal Resource Managers to take response actions under
CERCLA section 106 when there is an "imminent and substantial
endangerment" to the public's natural resources from actual or threatened
releases of hazardous substances." The statute authorizes the president to
designate state and federal trustees to assess resource damages under both
the CWA and CERCLA.
51
Although recovery is not limited to restoration costs, any damages
recovered by the trustees may only be used for restoration efforts.52 Unlike
the CWA, CERCLA is less clear as to how damages should be measured.
44. Id. at 675.
45. Id. at 677.
46. See Robinson, supra note 26, at 197 (citing S. REP. No. 101-94, at 2-5 (1989),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723-726; H.R. REP. No. 96-172, at 15-17 (1979),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6160, 6160-62).
47. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
48. Id. § 9602.
49. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(C).
50. Exec. Order No. 13,016, 61 Fed. Reg. 65,871 (1986).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f(2).
52. See id. § 9607(f)(I) (stating that trustees must use damage recoveries "without
further appropriation, for use only to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of such natural
resources").
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The settlement provision of CERCLA provides that trustees may only settle
a natural resource damage claim "if the potentially responsible party agrees
to undertake appropriate actions necessary to protect and restore the natural
resource damaged by [the] release or threatened release of hazardous
substances."53 This provision suggests that Congress's purpose in permitting
trustees to sue is to achieve full restoration.
Pursuant to the statute, the Department of the Interior promulgated
regulations detailing the proper and best available techniques for performing
an assessment of natural resources damages. 4 The provision that provides
for promulgation of these regulations states that the regulations should "take
into consideration factors including, but not limited to, replacement value,
use value, and ability of the ecosystem or resource to recover."55 Compli-
ance with the regulations creates a rebuttable presumption of accuracy for
any damage assessment, 5 6 so although the Department did not mandate that
its assessment procedures be followed, strict compliance with the regulations
is favorable for trustees in proceedings to recover natural resource damages
from the responsible parties.
1. Recovery of Natural Resources Under CERCLA
The first, and since rejected, damage assessment regulations were
promulgated by the Department of the Interior in 1986.57 The regulations
implemented both CERCLA and the CWA and provided that natural
resource damages were the "lesser of: restoration or replacement costs; or
diminution of use values."58 Effectively, because lost use values were
typically higher than restoration costs, damages were measured by the lost
53. Id. § 9622(j)(2).
54. See id. § 9651(c). This section directs the President to promulgate damage
assessment regulations and the President in turn delegated that authority to the Department
of the Interior.
55. Id. § 9651(c)(2). This statement also supports the court's finding in Ohio, that
Congress intended to permit consideration of nonuse values. See State of Ohio v. United
States Dept. of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 451-452 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
56. See id. § 9607(f)(2)(C).
57. Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 51 Fed. Reg. 27, 674 (1986) (codified at
43 C.F.R. pt. 11 (1987)) (hereinafter referred to as DOI's original regulations). CERCLA
provided for two types of natural resource damage asessment procedures: Type A and Type
B. Type A procedures provided a simplified aproach to evaluate damages in coastal and
marine environments, resulting from minor discharges of oil or hazardous substances. See
Natural Resource Damage Assessemnts, 52 Fed. Reg. 9042, 9042-45 (1987). The Type B
procedures described methods for site-specfic natural resource damage assessments to be
used for major accidents. See id. at 9045-49.
58. 43 C.F.R. § 11.35 (b)(2) (1987).
use values.59 The Department's mandated use of the "lesser of' rule
reflected the assumption that in all cases it was economically inefficient to
choose the restoration option when it was more costly than the diminution
in value.'
If the trustee chose the restoration option, the resource could only be
restored to the condition that it would have been in absent the discharge or
release.6' Trustees were prohibited from restoring the resource to a state
greater than its baseline condition.62 If the diminution in value alternative
was chosen, trustees were directed to first measure the diminution in use
value, using the actual market price of the damaged resource. 3 In the event
that the market was not reasonably competitive or the market price method
was inappropriate, trustees would then measure damages as the decrease in
appraisal value caused by the damage.' If this latter method was also
inappropriate, the trustees would calculate diminution in value by using a
method such as the factor income or hedonic pricing methods.6 ' Although
the regulations authorized the use of contingent valuation to evaluate both
use and nonuse values, the hierarchy or assessment methods established in
the regulations placed market valuation methods above contingent
valuation.6 Trustees could only assess nonuse values in cases where use
values could not be determined. 7
2. The Regulations are Challenged in Court
After the DOI's final promulgation of CERCLA's assessment proce-
dures in 1987, a number of states and environmental groups, in State of Ohio
v. United States Department of the Interior,68 successfully challenged the
assessment regulations on ten grounds. The court agreed with the
petitioners' argument that Congress intended restoration costs to be a
minimum measure of damages. 69 Because diminution of use value in most
cases would be lower than the cost of restoration, the court invalidated the
59. See Robinson, supra note 26, at 200.
60. See James S. Seevers, Jr., NOAA's New Natural Resource Damage Assessment
Scheme: It's Not About Collecting Money, 53 WASH. &LEEL. REv. 1513, 1524 (1996).
61. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.14(e).
62. See id. § 11.82(b)(iii).
63. See id. § 11.83(c)(1).
64. See id. § 11.83(c)(2)(ii).
65. See id. § 11.83(c)(2)(iii), (v).
66. See id. § 11.83(c)(1); see also Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d
432,462 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
67. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(d)(5)(ii).
68. See Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d at 432.
69. See id. at 445.
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requirement that damages be the lesser of restoration or replacement costs,
and the diminution of use values. 70 However, the court allowed damages
based on the diminution of use value where restoration costs disproportion-
ately exceeded the market value determination. 71 The court also required the
DOI to allow the use of economic valuation methodologies that would fully
value damaged resources, invalidating the restrictions on the use of such
methods.72 The court stated:
While it is not irrational to look to market price as one factor in
determining the use value of a resource, it is unreasonable to view
market price as the exclusive factor, or even the predominant one.
From the bald eagle to the blue whale and snail darter, natural
resources have values that are not fully captured by the market
system.73
In Colorado v. United States Department of the Interior,74 the court
remanded to the DOI the regulations that failed to incorporate restoration
and replacement values. 75 The court reasoned that the assessment regula-
tions that derived values that were based solely on use values were also not
in accord with the intentions of Congress.76
The decision in Ohio also upheld the use of survey methods such as
contingent valuation. 77 Surveys have been accepted in courts in various
contexts for many years. 78 At trial, the most relevant test of admissibility is
Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Rule 702 provides that "[i]f scientific...
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert ... may testify
70. See id.
71. See id. at 446.
72. See id. at 478.
73. Id. at 462-63 (citing Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 628
F.2d 652, 673-74 (Ist Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981)).
74. 880 F.2d 481 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
75. See id.at 491.
76. See id.
77. See Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d at 475. Contingent value
methods measure the passive uses of the environment by using public opinion polls in which
people are asked how much they are willing to pay to preserve or protect a particular
resource. See id. The dollar amounts are then multiplied by the number of people potentially
affected by an oil spill (arguably all people of the United States). See id.
78. See, e.g., Handbook ofRecommendedProceduresfor the Trial ofProtracted Cases,
Report of the Judicial Conference Study Group on Procedure in Protracted Litigation, 25
F.R.D. 351,425-430 (1960); Manualfor Complex Litigation, Second § 21.484 (2d ed. 1985)
(discussing polls and surveys and their admissibility); Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467,480-481
(9th Cir. 1988) (discussing surveys in civil rights cases).
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 7 9 Presented at court as
expert testimony, there seems little doubt that contingent value (CV) would
be accepted in the federal courts as a sufficiently reliable method to calculate
damages.
The Supreme Court's most recent interpretation of this rule of evidence
appears in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.8" The previous
ruling in Frye v. United States"' required that the judge focus admissibility
of expert testimony on whether the expert's opinion or conclusion was
generally accepted in his/her professional community.82 The Court, in
Daubert, superseded the previous ruling in Frye by holding that a judge
should assess "whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is scientifically valid. 8 3 The Court stated that four factors in
particular are necessary if the testimony is to be admissible.8 4 CV, in
general, is likely to meet each of these factors: (1) the technique is testable
by the scientific method;85 (2) CV has been subjected to much peer review
and publication;8 6 (3) the technique is accepted by the economics
profession;87 (4) though most controversially, CV is said to yield known or
measurable rates of error.8 Though generally considered admissible, any
specific CV survey may be inadmissible if it fails the parameters of Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 or Daubert.
3. DOI's Final Rules for Natural Resource Damage Assessment
Under CERCLA and the CWA
In compliance with the Ohio decision, the Department revised its
regulations.8 9 The new regulations required trustees to use some form of
79. FED. R. EVID 702.
80. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
81. 293 F. 1013 (App. D.C. 1923).
82. See id. at 1014.
83. Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 580 (1993) (emphasis
added).
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 583.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 59 Fed. Reg. 14, 261, 14, 252 (1994)
(codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11) (effective April 25, 1994). The damage assessment regulations
applied to natural resource damages resulting from the discharge of oil until February 6,
1996. See 15 C.F.R. § 990.20 (1999) (stating that trustees may complete assessments initiated
prior to February 5, 1996 in compliance with 43 CFR Part II, or using this part to obtain a
rebuttable presumption); see also 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (1994) (stating that notwithstanding
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restoration costs when performing a type B assessment pursuant to the
requirements of subpart E.90 Trustees were directed to consider a "range of
alternative actions that would accomplish the restoration, rehabilitation,
replacement, and/or acquisition of the equivalent of the injured natural
resources."'" Although the Ohio court suggested that the Department include
an exception for instances when the costs of restoration were "grossly
disproportionate," the regulations instead "allow trustee officials to rely upon
natural recovery when appropriate."92
The new regulations permit trustees to attempt to recover the cost of
restoration in addition to a temporary diminution in value. To facilitate
recovery, the Department also introduced the concept of "compensable
value," which is defined to include both lost public use and nonuse values
during the interim period between the injury and complete restoration.93
Because it is based on the interim losses, compensable value will typically
encompass only lost use values.94 Therefore, the required "No-Action-
Natural Recovery" option alternative will consist of lost use values, which
is a market based measure of loss. 95 Arguably, compensable value represents
a purely economic approach to assessing natural resource damages and to
some extent maintains the invalidated "lesser of' rule.96
Under the new regulations, trustees are given a great deal of discretion
in selecting which alternative to base damages on, guided only by a list of
ten criteria which are not ranked in any order of importance.97 The trustees
are required to look at numerous combinations of varying degrees of
restoration and monetary damages and consider each alternative's total
economic efficiency.98 Essentially, the choice of restoration method depends
any other provision of law, parties who are responsible for discharging oil are liable under
the OPA).
90. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.38(a) (1995).
91. Id. § 11.38(c)(2).
92. Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 59 Fed. Reg. at 14,271.
93. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c).
94. See Robinson, supra note 26, at 204.
95. See id.
96. See Douglas R. Williams, Valuing Natural Environments: Compensation, Market
Norms, and the Idea ofPublic Goods, 27 CoNN. L. REV. 365,427-434 (1995) (describing the
influential role of compensable value and arguing that it embodies a purely economic
approach to damages).
97. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.82(d). The ten factors include: (1) technical feasibility, (2) cost-
benefit analyses, (3) cost-effectiveness, (4) results of actual or planned response actions, (5)
potential for additional injury resulting from the response action, (6) time period for natural
recovery, (7) ability of the resource to recover with or without action, (8) potential effects of
the action on the public welfare, (9) consistency with federal, state and tribal policies, and
(10) compliance with federal, state, and tribal policies. Id.
98. See Seevers, supra note 60, at 1533-1534.
on the costs and benefits of each method when combined with the corre-
sponding compensable value component.99 Viewed in one light, this may
force trustees to justify restoration costs in terms of efficiency of total
damages.
CERCLA's innovation in its allowance for natural resource damage
assessments heavily influenced the development of the damage assessment
provisions of OPA. The provisions provide an improved and expeditious
mechanism for dealing with both minor and major injury events. The
procedures promulgated assess the value of direct losses of organisms and
their habitat and indirect losses of organisms and habitat through ecological
interactions. Both provisions accord assessments that are performed in
compliance with the regulations a rebuttable presumption of validity in
administrative and court proceedings. Though NOAA was charged with
promulgating OPA's damage assessment rules, the lessons learned by the
DOI in promulgating CERCLA's provisions guided NOAA.
4. The Exxon Valdez
On March 24, 1989, the tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground and ruptured
its tank on Bligh Reef, in Prince William Sound, Alaska, spilling nearly
eleven million gallons of crude oil into one of the nation's most sensitive
ecosystems in less than five hours.'00 It was the largest tanker spill in United
States history. During the following months, the oil migrated along the coast
of Alaska, oiling more than twelve hundred miles of shoreline and causing
severe damage to the various natural resources in the area. °1' Areas oiled by
the spill included a National Forest, four National Wildlife Refuges, three
National Parks, five State Parks, four State Critical Habitat Areas, and a
State Game Sanctuary.'0 2 The spill damaged important historical and
archeological resources and the toxic aftermath of the spill killed many birds
fish, and marine mammals.
The development of the case and the assessment plan offer ample
lessons, if not precedential value, for future assessments. 0 3 The goals of the
99. See Robinson, supra note 26 at 203.
100. See Christine Cartwright, NaturalResourceDamageAssessment: The Exxon Valdez
Oil Spill and its Implications, 17 RUTGER'S COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 451 (1991).
101. See id.
102. Oil Spill Public Information Center, What Happened on March 24, 1989, (Source:
Exxon Valdez Restoration Plan) <http://www.oilspilI.state.AK.us/history/history.htm#What
happened>.
103 See Settlement Agreement Concerning the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Between the
United States, the State of Alaska, and the Exxon Corp., Exxon Shipping Co., and Exxon
Pipeline Co., 56 Fed. Reg. 11,636 (1991).
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State/Federal Natural Resource Damage Assessment Plan for the Exxon
Valdez Oil Spill"° were to provide the information necessary for the trustees
to manage and restore the injured resources and to provide the necessary
documentation for the trustees to present a claim for damages to the
responsible parties. The Plan had three major elements: (1) quantification
and determination of injury; (2) determination of damages; and (3)
development of a restoration strategy. By emphasizing that the "total" value
of the damage incurred is included in the damage assessment, the Plan
establishes the standard for future assessment plan and litigation. 105
By April of 1991, the government trustees had reached a settlement for
$1.1 billion.'0 6 Before the settlement, the trustees commissioned a CV
survey that was conducted in private homes across the nation. The pilot
studies were conducted in San Jose, California, Toledo and Dayton, Ohio,
and five rural counties in Georgia. The final study was administered to 1600
homes representing 61 counties throughout the United States. 10 7 Using CV
methodology, the Exxon Valdez spill damage was calculated at $3 billion.'0 8
The litigants subsequently settled for $900 million.
Even though settled out of court, new standards in environmental
settlements, natural resource damage assessments and scientific research
emerged from the Exxon Valdez accident. The incident catalyzed a
reevaluation of clean up technology and sparked the final enactment of the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990. The litigation surrounding the Exxon spill
provided a proving ground for CV and large settlement negotiations. As
environmental damage assessment figures increase, so will settlement
awards and so too will the industry's scrutiny of damage assessment
methodologies. However, the Exxon Valdez settlement may have set a
standard for future large spill cases and the use of CV as a measurement tool
in natural resource injury claims. 109
104. See Cartwright, supra note 100, at 451.
105. See id. at 493.
106. See Danielle Stager, From Kepone to Exxon Valdez Oil and Beyond: An Overview
of Natural Resource Damage Assessment, 29 U. RICH. L. REv. 751, 776 (1995).
107. See Katherine K. Baker, Consorting With Forests: Rethinking Our Relationship to
Natural Resources and How We Should Value Their Loss, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 677, 723
(1995).
108. See Stager, supra note 106, at 776.
109. See id. at 771, 782-3 (citing Marguerite Holloway, Soiled Shores; Prince William
Sound Oil Spill, 1989; Trends in Environmental Technology, 265 Sci. AM. 102 (1991)).
D. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990
The Oil Pollution Act (OPA) was enacted in direct response to the Exxon
Valdez incident. The public opinion awakened by the Valdez spill provided
the necessary impetus to get this comprehensive oil spill legislation
enacted."1 Congress found that the Valdez spill, coupled with other recent
spills, "demonstrated that oil pollution from accidental tanker spills is a real
and continuing threat to the public health and welfare and the
environment..'' To counter this threat, OPA allows unlimited liability for
gross negligence, willful misconduct, or a violation of federal operating or
safety standards."' OPA also establishes a federal oil spill trust fund to be
used to pay for damages and cleanup costs in instances when the responsible
party is unknown, cannot or will not pay, or is protected by a limitation of
liability.'
Section 1002(a) makes responsible parties liable for damages resulting
from the discharge of oil.1 4 The statute specifies that damages include:
"[d]amages for injury to, destruction of, loss of, or loss of use of, natural
resources, including the reasonable, costs of assessing the damage, which
shall be recoverable by [trustees]," as well as "[d]amages for loss of
subsistence use of natural resources, which shall be recoverable by any
claimant who so uses natural resources which have been injured, destroyed,
or lost, without regard to the ownership or management of the resources." 115
Natural resource damages are measured by: "(A) the cost of restoring,
rehabilitating, replacing, or acquiring the equivalent of, the damaged natural
resources; (B) the diminution in value of those natural resources pending
restoration; plus (C) the reasonable cost of assessing those damages.'1 6
Trustees are required to spend all sums recovered from a natural resource
damage claim on improving the natural resource, and they must also
110. See S. REP. No. 101-94, 101st Cong., reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 723.
111. Id.
112. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(l)-(2) (1994).
113. See id. §§ 2712-2713. The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund was established under
section 9509 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. The Fund is available under certain
circumstances to fund removal of oil pursuant to section 311 of the Clean Water Act (CWA)
(1998). The responsible party is liable for federal removal costs and for damages described
in section 311(f) of the CWA, section 1002 of OPA and other relevant federal statutes. See
33 C.F.R. § 136 (1999). Pursuant to Title I of OPA, the state or states affected by an oil
discharge may act where necessary for removal. States may be reimbursed from the Fund for
the reasonable costs of removal performed. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.335(f)(2) (1998).
114. See 33 U.S.C. § 2702.
115. Id. § 2702(b)(2)(A),(C).
116. Id. § 2706(d)(1).
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implement the restoration plan which the damages claim was based on."
7
Damage recoveries in excess of the necessary restoration costs must be
deposited in the trust fund for restoration of resources."8
Congress embraced the diminution in value standard and the balance
between restoration and residual loss that was established in the Ohio case.
Citing the reasoning in the Ohio decision concerning interim diminution in
value, Congress instructed that both lost use and nonuse values be included
in the diminution-of-value component of damages." 9 Although Congress
was attempting to mandate full restoration of the entire economic value of
the damaged resource, by following the Ohio decision, Congress and NOAA
overlooked the fact that most natural resources are not capable of being
valued by a common standard.
20
The legislative history of OPA reflects Congress's dissatisfaction with
the traditional measure of damages:
The bill makes clear that forests are more than board feet of lumber,
and that seals and sea otters are more than just commodities traded
on the market. It would clarify that in the wake of spills like the
Exxon Valdez, all reasonable demonstrable natural resource damages
caused by a spill are paid by the responsible parties, rather than
borne by the public.'
2
'
The goal of OPA is to "make the environment and public whole for injuries
to natural resources and services resulting from an incident involving a
discharge or substantial threat of a discharge of oil.' ' 22 Congress directed
NOAA to promulgate regulations establishing procedures for assessing
natural resource damages caused by discharge of oil.' The regulations
declare that OPA's goal may be achieved by returning the damaged resource
to baseline and by compensating interim losses incurred between the date of
the incident until recovery.
117. See id. § 2706(c) (directing federal, state, foreign, and Indian trustees to "develop
and implement a plan for the restoration, rehabilitation, replacement, or acquisition of the
equivalent, of the natural resources").
118. See id. § 2706(f).
119. See S. REP.No. 101-94, at 15 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 772, 736-737;
see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-653, at 108 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779,
786.
120. See Seevers, supra note 61, at 1535-1536.
121. See S. REP. No. 101-94, at 15 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 737.
122. 15 C.F.R. § 990.10 (1999).
123. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2706(e)(1) (1994).
1. NOAA's Rules for Natural Resource Damage Assessment Under
OPA
The regulations proposed by NOAA in 1994 roughly paralleled the
Department of the Interior's revised regulations. 24 One distinction was that
NOAA expanded the number of categories of assessment methods and
instructed trustees to recover the compensable value plus all restoration
costs."z The four assessment procedures were: compensation formulas,
computer models, Expedited Damage Assessments, and Comprehensive
Damage Assessments. 26 The proposed rule also listed five methods for
measuring compensable values: travel cost method, factor income method,
hedonic price method, market method, market method, and contingent
valuation. 27 The rule provided trustees with extensive guidance on how to
use contingent valuation, placing few limitations on when that method might
be used.'
28
After opening the proposed rules to public comment, NOAA revised the
damage assessment procedures in 1995, this time placing a greater emphasis
on restoration.'29 NOAA summarized the major changes as: (1) not requiring
that compensable value be considered as a separate component of natural
resource damage claims; (2) focusing restoration methods on the natural
resource and its human and ecological services; (3) raising public involve-
ment in the selection of the restoration action; and (4) allowing trustees to
determine appropriate assessment methods on a case-by-case basis.
1 31
On January 5, 1996, NOAA published its Final Rule, maintaining the
changes enumerated in the 1995 proposal.1 31 Similar to the Department's
124. See Williams, supra note 96, at 428-429 (noting that NOAA and DOI regulations
are similar but that NOAA's are "much less resistant to restoration costs as the presumptive
measure of damages").
125. See Seevers, supra note 60, at 1537.
126. See id. at 1536 & n.65.
127. See idat 1537 & n.167. In addition, NOAA listed two "alternative methods": the
benefits transfer approach and the habitat or species replacement cost method. Id.
128. See id. at 1537; see also Williams, supra note 96, at 437 (stating that proposed
NOAA rules authorize "general resort" to contingent valuation).
129. See id. at 1537, referencing Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 60 Fed. Reg.
39,804 (proposed Aug. 3, 1995) (stating that in response to numerous public comments,
"NOAA is considering a fundamental restructuring of the rule to provide even greater
emphasis upon restoration") [hereinafter 1995 Proposed Rule].
130. Seevers, supra note 61, at 1537-1538 (citing Natural Resource Damage
Assessments, 60 Fed. Reg. 39,804).
131. Natural Resource Damage Assessments, Final Rule 61 Fed. Reg. 440 (1996) (to be
codified at 15 C.F.R. 990) [hereinafter Final Rule]. The Final Rule states that the purpose of
OPA and Natural Resources Damage Assessment regulation is to "make the environment and
public whole," whereas the rules proposed in 1994 sought only to "make the public whole."
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regulations, NOAA's regulations state that trustees must consider natural
recovery.'32 Rather than requiring a strict cost-benefit analysis, the regu-
ations state that "[t]rustees must select the most cost-effective of two or more
equally preferable alternatives."' 33 However, NOAA did not clarify what
constitutes "equally preferable alternatives." This inclusion of natural
recovery adds a twist to the general understanding of restoration.
The new regulations carved only a narrow role for contingent valuation.
Damages are divided into primary and compensatory restoration. Primary
restoration embodies what DOI regulations consider restoration. 34 The
purpose of compensatory restoration is to provide comparable services or
resources during the period between the injury and full restoration.'35
Contingent valuation is only used for compensatory restoration, and only
when the trustees selects a valuation approach, rather than selecting a
resource-to-resource or service-to-service approach. 36 Instead of using it to
monetize damages, trustees only use contingent valuation to scale the level
of compensatory restoration required.'37 By restricting the use of contingent
valuation, NOAA significantly limited the inclusion of nonuse values. Also,
with natural recovery, the costs associated with restoration are minimal,
resulting in damage awards based almost entirely on the compensable value
component.'
38
The assessment procedure prescribed in the regulations consists of three
phases: the Pre-Assessment Phase, the Restoration Planning Phase, and the
Restoration Implementation Phase. 39 In the Pre-Assessment phase, the
trustee must determine whether OPA applies to the discharge and whether
a successful damage claim can be made. Once the decision to proceed has
been made, the trustee must select an appropriate assessment method. '40
The Restoration Planning Phase is broken into Injury Assessment and
Restoration Selection. 4 ' During Injury Assessment, the trustees identify
injuries sustained by the resource, evaluate the injuries deserving of
attention, and quantify those injuries. 14 The Restoration Selection portion
Seevers, supra note 60, at 1538.
132. See Final Rule, supra note 131, at 441.
133. Id. at442.
134. Id. at 441.
135. See id. at 452.
136. See id. at 453.
137. See id. at 442.
138. See Robinson, supra note 26, at 208.
139. See 15 C.F.R. § 990.12 (1999).
140. See id. § 990.44-.45.
141. See id. § 990.50
142. See id. § 990.51-52.
may best represent NOAA's new valuation approach. '43 It requires that
trustees consider a reasonable range of restoration alternatives, each
including both primary and compensatory restoration components."
Primary restoration consists of human intervention or natural recovery
that restores the resource to its baseline condition.145 Trustees must consider
at least one natural recovery alternative and one active primary restoration
alternative.'16 In natural recovery, no human intervention is taken to directly
restore the resource and its services to baseline condition. 147 Active primary
restoration is defined as "an alternative comprised of actions to directly
restore the natural resources and services to baseline on an accelerated time
frame."'
48
The regulations reflect a strong preference for compensatory restoration
of resources. The purpose of compensatory restoration actions is to
compensate the public for interim loss of natural resources and services
pending the recovery ofactual natural resources and services. 49 Compensa-
tory restoration must be considered any time that there is interim loss of
natural resource services.' 50 Trustees must consider compensatory restora-
tion actions that would provide replacement resources or services that are
equivalent, or at least comparable, to those injured.' 5 ' Based on the notion
that baseline restoration and monetary damages for interim lost value is not
adequate to achieve OPA's goal of making the environment and the public
whole, compensatory restoration effectively replaces the concept of
compensable value.' 52 This is perhaps the most significant practical and
theoretical change in the new assessment regulations.'
53
Once trustees have considered various primary and compensatory
restoration alternatives, they must determine the appropriate scale for each
alternative to make the environment and the public whole."T Scaling applies
to primary restoration actions that seek to replace or acquire equivalent
resources, and to all compensatory restoration actions. ' The regulations
143. See Seevers, supra note 60, at 1539.
144. See 15 C.F.R. § 990.53.
145. See id. § 990.53(b).
146. See id. § 990.53(b).
147. See id. § 990.53(b)(2).
148. Id. § 990.53(b)(3).
149. See id. § 990.53(c).
150. See Seevers, supra note 60, at 1540.
151. See 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(c)(2).
152. See Seevers, supra note 60, at 1540.
153. See id.
154. 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(d)(1).
155. See id. § 990.53(c)(2)-(d)(2).
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contain three scaling approaches: general, resource-to-resource and service-
to-service approaches (hereinafter "service-to-service"), and the valuation
approach.1
56
Trustees must consider the service-to-service approach for actions that
provide equivalent or comparable resources and services to replace those
injured. 57 This approach attempts to match the lost resources and services
with additional resources and services.'58 When a spill injures indirect public
use of a resource, NOAA recommends that trustees use an economic annuity
approach called Habitat Equivalency Analysis.'59 This method focuses on
compensating for interim lost values with additional values, rather than
affixing monetary values.'60
When this approach is not appropriate, trustees may employ the
valuation approach.' 6' Under this approach, the trustees select a unit of
value, calculate a value for the injured resources and services, and then scale
the replacement resources and services to that determined value. 62 Although
the regulations are not clear as to when the different valuation procedures
should be used, they do suggest that a trustee may only resort to tacking
dollar values to lost resources and services when they cannot perform a
service-to-service or valuation approach at a reasonable cost, within a
reasonable period of time. 
63
Overall, the regulations afford the trustees a great deal of discretion in
determining which assessment procedure to use, supplying only a list of
criteria for trustees to use. The regulations note that any assessment
procedure must comply with the following standards:
(1) The procedure must be capable of providing assessment
information of use in determining the type and scale of restoration
appropriate for a particular injury; (2) The additional cost of a more
complex procedure must be reasonably related to the expected
increase in the quantity and/or quality of relevant information
provided by the more complex procedure; and (3) The procedure
must be reliable and valid for the particular incident."
156. See id. § 990.53(d)(2)-(3).
157. See id. § 990.53(d)(2).
158. See id.
159. See id. § 990.27.
160. See Seevers, supra note 60, at 1541-1542.
161. See 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(d)(3)(i).
162. See Seevers, supra note 60, at 1542.
163. See 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(d)(3)(ii).
164. Id. § 990.27(a).
Responsible parties are allowed to request that certain procedures be used if
they can offer sufficient support for the request and if they agree not to
challenge the results, but a trustee may simply refuse the request.1 65
Next, the scaled restoration alternatives must be evaluated according to
the regulatory standards. 66 If more than one alternative is appropriate or
preferable, trustees must choose the most cost-effective alternative.' 67 Once
the alternative is selected, trustees must develop a Restoration Plan, which
is subject to public comment. Finally, trustees present a demand to the
responsible parties to either undertake implementation of the Final Restora-
tion Plan (under the supervision of trustee) or to pay all costs associated with
implementing the Plan. 68  Trustees are authorized to settle the natural
resource damage claim as long as the settlement agreement "satisf[ies] the
goals of OPA and is fair, reasonable, and in the public interest, with
particular consideration of the adequacy of the settlement to restore, replace,
rehabilitate, or acquire the equivalent of the injured natural resources and
services."' 69 All costs recovered must be used to reimburse the trustees and
to implement the restoration plan.17
0
2. Analysis of the NOAA Rules
Common law damage theory and earlier damage assessment rules under
CERCLA and OPA focused on methods to determine dollar amounts
representing the cost of restoring the natural resource to its common
condition, the diminution in value of the resource pending its restoration, or
both.' 7' As they attempt to account for the various ways they people value
natural resources, the new OPA regulations set aside the previously
prevalent monetary valuation methods in favor of a theory based on
compensation for interim lost value of the natural resource.
Through the promulgation of these regulations, NOAA has assumed the
lead in natural resource damage assessment, embracing a new course of
165. See id. § 990.14(6).
166. Id. § 990.54(a). The six standards are:
(1) the cost, (2) the extent to which the alternative is expected to restore the resource
and service to its baseline condition and compensate the public for interim losses, (3)
the likelihood of success, (4) the extent to which the alternative prevents future or
collateral injuries, (5) the extent to which the alternative benefits more than one natural
resource, and (6) the effect of the alternative on public welfare.
Id.
167. See id. § 990.54(b).
168. See id. § 990.62(b).
169. Id. § 990.25.
170. See id. § 990.65(a).
171. See Seevers, supra note 60, at 1516.
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policy discussion on natural resource damage assessments. NOAA has
subordinated economic efficiency to OPA's goal of making the environment
and the public whole, and given trustees the necessary flexibility to address
a variety of spill conditions. The assessment procedure minimizes the role
of contingent valuation and infrequently allows trustees to resort to monetary
valuation of nonuse values.
NOAA's natural resources damage assessment process has been limited
by the absence of the regulatory provisions that, in particular, would yield
expeditious and cost-effective assessments and presumably prompt
recoveries of damages in the overwhelming number of smaller-to-medium
sized oil spills. One critic conjectures that many trustees have ignored these
spills and have failed to seek damages, in part because the anticipated
procedures are not fully in place and because they fear the problems of tort
litigation without a rebuttable presumption.'72 Though this conjecture is
unsupported in any of the other literature, case law and statutes herein
discussed, it presents an interesting question if true.
3. The Morris J. Berman
In early January 1994, the oil barge Morris J. Berman struck a coral reef
off the coast of San Juan, Puerto Rico, spilling 750,000 gallons of oil into
coastal waters and onto the beachfront at Punta Escambron.'73 Prior to
containment and cleanup efforts, the spill extended from Rio Grande de
Loiza in the east to Isla de Cabras in the west. Less than one week after the
spill, the oil was reportedly caked in layers seven to ten centimeters thick at
beaches east of the coral reef on which the ship ran aground. The coral reef
sustained the most substantial damage. 74  Trustees spent $90 million
cleaning up the oil and compensating victims.
75
NOAA fined three corporations a total of $75 million, the largest
criminal fine to date for an environmental crime. 176 The Captain of the
172. See Gordon J. Johnson, Paying the Piper: Comments on Liability for Natural
Resource Injury: Beyond Tort, 6 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 265, 274-75 (1996).
173. See Charles S. Donovan & Elizabeth M. Miller, How is OPA 90 Faring From the
Vessel Interests'Perspective? A Look at the Morris J. Berman Oil Spill and the Current Rule
on Certificates of Financial Responsibility, 7 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 23 (1994); see also Dept. of
Justice News Release, Three Corporations Fined $75 Million for Puerto Rico Oil Spill,
Largest Federal Envronmental Criminal Fine in U.S. History, DOJ 96-470, Sept. 25, 1996,
at 1, available in 1996 WL 545066.
174. See Donovan, supra note 173, at 27.
175. See Department of Justice News Release, supra note 173, at 1. A faulty towing
cable broke while a tugboat was towing the tank barge from San Juan to the Island of
Antigua. See id.
176. See id. A federal judge in Puerto Rico sentenced Bunker Group Puerto Rico, Bunker
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vessel pleaded guilty to negligently causing the oil spill, in violation of the
Clean Water Act. At the sentencing, the judge said that the "recklessly
negligent" conduct of the three liable corporations produced a "catastrophic
event." In April of 1996, a federal jury convicted the corporations of
sending out an unseaworthy vessel, negligently discharging oil, and failing
to notify the Coast Guard that a hazardous condition existed on the vessel.'77
Scientists feared that this accident damaged a coral environment that may
never recover.
IV. RECOVERY FOR CORAL REEF DAMAGES RESULTING FROM
SHIP GROUNDINGS
A. The National Marine Sanctuaries Act
Formerly referred to as Title III of the Marine Protections, Research, and
Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA), the NMSA is the primary statute governing the
designation and management of protected marine areas of special signifi-
cance. 7' A stated purpose of the NMSA is to "maintain, restore, and
enhance living resources by providing places for species that depend upon
these marine areas to survive and propagate."'79 Under the statute, NOAA
is directed to designate National Marine Sanctuaries and to develop and
evaluate management plans for these areas. Although the statute permits
continuation of certain existing rights in sanctuary areas, such as leases and
licenses, the statute also prohibits destruction, injury or loss of sanctuary
resources, and establishes liability for natural resource damages and response
costs.
Similar to the previously discussed statutes, section 302 of the NMSA
defines natural resources damages to include "the cost of replacing,
restoring, or acquiring the equivalent of a sanctuary resource; the value of
the lost use of the resource pending its restoration; the cost of damage
assessments, and; reasonable costs of monitoring."
Section 303 of the NMSA subjects violators of sanctuary regulations to
administratively imposed fines. Notice and an opportunity to be heard are
prerequisites to the levying of such fines. Federal district courts are
authorized to compel payment of these fines, conduct in rem proceedings
Group Incorporated, and New England Marine Services to each pay a $25 million fine and
complete a five year term of corporate probation. See id.
177. See id.
178. About DARP, NOAA's web site for the Damage Assessment and Restoration
Program (DARP) (visited Jan. 25, 1998) <http://www-orca.nos.noaa.gov/darp/about.htm>.
179. Marine Protections, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1992, 16 U.S.C. § 143 l(b)(9)
(1994).
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brought against vessels involved in such violations, and issue injunctions and
grant other appropriate relief. " The language "other appropriate relief'
implies the authority necessary to compel restitution for damages to the
sanctuary, including the costs of restoration.
Section 306 of the NMSA specifically states that it is unlawful to:
damage sanctuary resources that are specifically protected by law or
regulation; violate any provision of the NMSA or regulations issued
pursuant to the NMSA; possess any sanctuary resources taken illegally; or
interfere with the enforcement of the NMSA. This language provides clear
authority for enforcement of sanctuary regulations. In addition, section
306(1) provides the Secretary with preemptive authority and responsibility
by making any action that may injure or destroy a protected sanctuary
resource an unlawful act, which the Secretary is compelled to prevent. 8 1
Section 312 establishes liability for the destruction, loss of or injuries to
sanctuary resources and authorizes the pursuit of civil actions for response
costs and damages. Recovered response costs are used to: finance response
actions and damage assessments; restore, replace or acquire the equivalent
of the injured sanctuary resources; and manage and improve national marine
sanctuaries. Also, liability under section 312 constitutes a maritime lien on
any vessel involved in the violation. Because the 1992 amendments
eliminated language that limited the liability of a vessels owner to the value
of the vessel and its cargo, section 312 liability may extend to the full
amount of damages and appropriate response costs.'82 The Act authorizes
the Secretary to take proactive measures to minimize damage to sanctuary
resources. 183
National Marine Sanctuaries are administered by the Sanctuaries and
Reserves Division of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
in the United States Department of Commerce. The NMSA authorizes broad
powers to enforce regulations. Violators may be subject to civil penalties,
injunctive relief, forfeiture of vessels and other items involved in violations,
and payment for storage, care and other costs.
8 4
The NMSA confers certain enforcement powers to the sanctuary
managers, including the authority to board, search, inspect, and seize vessels
suspected of violating sanctuary laws or regulations, and the authority to
seize any sanctuary resource taken unlawfully. 8 5 Those found to be in
180. Seeid. § 1437 (1994).
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id. § 1442(b)(1).
184. Seeid. § 1437.
185. See id. § 1437(b).
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violation of any sanctuary provision will be held liable for a civil penalty not
exceeding $100,000.186 Although the NMSA grants the Secretary in rem
authority over any vessel found to have violated the statute, civil penalties
enforced against a vessel are of a lower priority in the disposition of the
proceeds from the sale of the vessel than maritime liens recorded against the
vessel.'87 Section 307(d)(1) makes it clear that forfeiture claims may not be
set-off against sanctuary resource damage claims or civil penalties; a
forfeiture constitutes a separate claim.
The NMSA authorizes the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of Commerce, to enter into negotiations with other governments
for the protection of national marine sanctuaries. 8 Any person who
destroys or injures any sanctuary resource is liable to the United States for
response costs and damages, plus interest." 9 Any vessels used to cause such
injury or loss shall be liable in rem for such damages.' 90 The Secretary is
directed to use the collected response costs and damages to finance response
actions, damage assessments, and the restoration and management of
national marine sanctuaries. 19'
Management of a sanctuary includes an appropriate level of enforce-
ment. The NMSA and accompanying regulations are fully enforceable as
domestic law within the twelve-mile territorial seas of the United States.
Section 305 also grants the Secretary authority to designate, and enforce the
regulations of, national marine sanctuaries in the United States exclusive
economic zone, consistent with international law.192 The implementing
regulations are to be applied "in accordance with generally recognized
principles of international law, and in accordance with treaties, conventions,
and other agreements to which the United States is a party.' 93
B. The Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary
The Keys are home to many unique resources, including: America's only
living barrier coral reef, patch reefs, hardbottom, vast seagrass meadows,
mangrove fringing islands, and the diverse marine life that these marine
communities support. The living coral reefs provide shelter and a source of
food for recreationally and commercially important marine life. NOAA has
186. See id. § 1437(c).
187. See 15 C.F.R. § 922.46 (1995).
188. See 16 U.S.C. § 1435(b).
189. See id. § 1443(a)(1).
190. See id. § 1443(a)(2).
191. See id. § 1443(d).
192. See id. § 14370).
193. 15 C.F.R. § 922.46 (1995).
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successfully designated three National Marine Sanctuaries in the Florida
Keys. The Key Largo National Marine Sanctuary was designated in 1975,
followed by the Looe Key National Marine Sanctuary in 1981. On
November 16, 1990, Congress designated an area of the marine environment
surrounding the Florida Keys as the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary
(FKNMS).
Prohibited activities within the Sanctuary include the discharge or
deposit of particular materials. Cooling water from vessels, gray water from
vessels, and biodegradable effluent incidental to vessel use and generated by
marine sanitation devices are excepted from the prohibition. Also, no one
may operate a vessel "in such a manner as to strike or otherwise injure coral,
seagrass, or any other immobile organism attached to the seabed."', 94 The
regulations also prohibit mariners from"operating a vessel in such a manner
as to injure, take or cause disturbance to wading, roosting, or nesting birds
or marine mammals" and "operating a vessel in a manner which unreason-
ably or unnecessarily endangers life, limb, marine resources, or property." 95
C. Ship Groundings Within Sanctuaries
The natural blockades of coral reefs pose serious threats to vessels of all
sizes, particularly in the Caribbean and around the Florida Keys.
96
Unfortunately, when ships run aground on coral reefs, they have the
potential to cause enormous damage to the reefs, in addition to any damage
to the ship. In 1994 alone, the Florida Marine Patrol reported 550 ground-
ings within the FKNMS. In some areas, groundings have completely altered
the coral reef community structure. Salvage and towing operations often
exacerbate the problem, as the reef may be devastated if it suffers direct loss
of corals or fracturing of the reef structure.'97 Accordingly, "[i]t is the
responsibility of the mariner and operator of vessels to be aware of
194. Id. § 922.163(a)(5)(i).
195. Id. § 922.163(5)(iii)(E). The region within the FKNMS known as Tortugas Bank
has traditionally served as an anchoring area for large foreign flag vessels waiting to enter
port. Over time, vessels began to anchor directly on the Bank, causing significant damage.
In 1998, NOAA amended the FKNMS regulations to prohibit vessels fifty meters or greater
in length from anchoring on Tortugas Bank. See id.
196. See American Geological Institute, Rehabilitating Coral Reefs (visited Apr. 25,
1998) <http://www.agiweb.org/agi/news/geotmja8.html>.
197. In the event that a grounding is reported, sanctuary officials are obligated to prevent
grounded vessels from proceeding or removing itself until they are satified that the removal
is being conducted properly. See In the Matter of Peter G. Kuhnle, Indian Boat Co., 5 O.R.W.
337, 342 (1988).
obstructions and protected sensitive areas, particularly within marine
sanctuaries."' '
Under the NMSA, owners and operators of offending vessels may be
held jointly and severally liable for civil penalties based on damages
inflicted on coral reefs.' 99 The NMSA and implementing regulations provide
persons charged in violation thereof the opportunity for hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) regarding the assessment of civil
penalties."° While reviewing the assessed penalty, the ALJ may take into
account the nature, circumstances, extent and gravity of the violation, the
degree of culpability, prior enforcement proceedings, and the party's ability
to pay.2"1 The basic rule is that a penalty may be substantially altered from
the amount originally assessed only on the basis of stated good reasons. 2
A negligent vessel operator cannot escape responsibility for compliance
by asserting a lack of knowledge of the law.03 Strict liability generally
applies unless the action that causes the damage was necessary "to respond
to an emergency threatening life, property, or the environment."20' ALJ
Hugh Dolan narrowly construed the emergency exception, finding that "the
reasonably foreseeable effects of an individual's actions or inaction would
not qualify as an 'emergency' nor would emergencies arising out of
circumstances created by an individual be entitled to the status of
'emergency' for the purpose of the exception."205
198. In the Matter of Donald G. Brown, 6 O.R.W. 255, 257 (1990).
199. Although the NMSA does not explicitly provide for the imposition of joint and
several liability, NOAA looked to the standards and scope of liability of the CWA and
determined that the impositions of joint and several liability is consistent with the purposes
of the NMSA. See In the Matter of James S. Mattson, 4 O.R.W. 202 (1985); see also In the
Matter of Dale Hansley, Real McCoy, Inc., 3 O.P.W. 749 (1984). Under the NMSA, even an
absentee vessel owner may be found liable fo reef damage caused while the vessel was
operated by another individual if some evidence exists that the owner's conduct was a
substantial cause of the reef damage at issue. See Deaton v. United States Dept. of
Commerce, No. 86-1732 (S.D. Fla. Jan, 31, 1989).
200. See National Marine Sanctuaries Act,16 U.S.C. §1443 (1994).
201. See, e.g., In the Matter of Peter G. Kuhnle, 5 O.R.W. at 342. In an administrative
proceeding, the mariner has the burden of proving inability to pay the assessed civil penalty.
See 15 C.F.R. § 904.108(c) (1988).
202. Seen theMatterofVerna, 4 O.RW. 64(1985) (codifiedat 15 C.F.R. § 904.204(1)).
203. "Individuals are properly charged with a responsibility to be aware of the pertinent
content of [sanctuary] laws and regulations. Proof of individual awareness of the law is not
required in determining whether a violation of the Act has occurred." See In the Matter of
William E. Furcron, 5 O.R.W. 195 (1988).
204. 15 C.F.R. § 929.7(a).
205. In the Matter of Joel W. Jenison, 4 O.R.W. 309, 313 (1985).
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1. The F/V Cleo
In May of 1983, the F/V Cleo ran aground inside the Looe Key National
Marine Sanctuary, damaging a large section of coral. °6 The captain was
charged with unlawfully breaking or damaging coral with the sanctuary, °7
and operating a vessel in such a manner as to strike or otherwise cause
damage to the sanctuary resource. 28  Although NMFS had offered a
compromise settlement in the amount of $4,000, ALJ Dolan assessed a total
civil penalty of $50,000, the maximum amount authorized under the NMSA.
Anticipating a negative reaction to the arguably excessive penalty, Judge
Dolan stated that:
The Coast Guard or other licensing agents should have and exercise
the power to sanction the [captain's] authority to operate a seagoing
vessel. The F/V Cleo should be forfeited, cleaned and consigned to
a watery grave seaward of the damage it wrought to protect the reef
or in some other appropriate place where it would serve as a fish
haven to enhance the natural resource that it destroyed. 209
2. The M/VMidas
The 1986 grounding of the M/VMidas is another case in which Judge
Dolan imposed an amount of civil penalties greater than that proposed by
NMFS. 2'0 The vessel ran aground on the northeast side of the French Reef,
206. In the Matter of Dale Hansley, Real McCoy, Inc., 3 O.R.W. 749 (1984). Inspection
of the reef after the grounding and following the removal of the fishing vessel revealed an
area of damage approximately eighteen and one half meters long and five and one half
meters wide. See id. at 751.
207. At the time of the administrative proceeding, 15 C.F.R. § 937.6(a)(1)(i) provided:
"No person shall break, cut or similarly damage or take any coral or marine invertebrate
except as an incidental result of an anchoring outside the Fore Reef where sand anchoring is
encouraged byut not required."
208. At the time of the adminstrative proceeding, 15 C.F.R. § 937.6(a)(2)(iii) provided:
"Watercraft shall not be operated in such a manner as to strike or otherwise cause damage to
the natural features of the Sanctuary."
209. In the Matter of Dale Hansley, Real McCoy, Inc., 3 O.R.W. at 749, n. 12. This
decision was later cited as a case in which the responsible party was singled out for harsher
treatment than was customary. See In the Matter of James S. Mattson, 4 O.R.W. 202, 211
(1985). The Judge's disdain for the derelict fishing vessel was evident: "[It] impresses me
as being a rust bucket which functioned on a par with its skipper. It was apparently
resurrected from salvage and seems to me to be the type vessel that gives the word 'tramp'
a bad name in maritime parlance." Id. at n. 6.
210. See In the Matter of Peter G. Kuhnle, Indian Boat Co., 5 O.R.W. 337 (1988); In the
Matter of Peter G. Kuhlne, 5 O.R.W. 514 (1989).
located within the Key Largo National Marine Sanctuary.2"' Sanctuary
officers estimated that approximately 4,639 square meters of reef were
damaged by the incident." Various deficiencies on board rendered the
vessel unseaworthy, including mechanical failures of the engine, winch,
generator, and anchor, as well as lack of necessary navigational aids.21 3 The
captain reported that the mechanical problems were largely attributable to
the negligence of an intoxicated engineer, who accidentally pumped
seawater into the fuel tanks. The proposed penalty was in the amount of
$39,000, but the ALJ determined that a $50,000 penalty was more appropri-
ate in light of the "egregious incompetence" which the captain demonstrat-
ed. 214
3. M/VMiniLaurel
The Panamanian registered bulk freighter, M/VMiniLaurel, ran aground
on Molasses Reef, located in the Key Largo National Marine Sanctuary on
December 11, 1986. The vessel did not run hard aground, but rather passed
directly over a shallow portion of the reef, cutting a lengthy groove in the top
of the coral ridge. 2"5 A steel light tower sits atop the reef to alert mariners,
yet many still travel close to the reef line in order to avoid the direct effect
of the gulf stream. According to ALJ Dolan, the factors which rendered the
circumstances "most aggravated" included: use of an outdated chart, close
proximity to the light tower, lack of a lookout, failure to observe mooring
buoys, the amount of damage sustained by the coral reef, and the overall
negligent navigation of the vessel.216 The liable parties filed a Petition for
Discretionary Review of the imposed $25,000 civil penalty, but the petition
was denied.217
211. Seeid.
212. See id. at n.2.
213. See In the Matter of Peter G. Kuhnle, 5 O.R.W. 514 (1989).
214. See In the Matter of Peter G. Kuhnle, Indian Boat Co., 5 O.R.W. 345 (1988). Judge
Dolan again offered colorful commentary: "My comments in Hansley... apply equally here.
This utterly incompetent master appears to have learned his trade on the likes of the not very
good ship Calibar." Id. at n.15.
215. See In the Matter of Tsangeos Panagiotis Seagroup, Inc., 5 O.R.W. 392 (1988), 5
O.tLW. 475 (1989). The port and starboard contact points (skegs) of the freighter cut tracks
in the ridge "[l]ike two dull knives." Id.
216. See In the Matter ofTsangeos Panagiotis Seagroup, Inc., 5 O.R.W. 392, n.4 (1988).
217. See In the Matter of Tsangeos Panagiotis Seagroup, Inc., 5 O.R.W. 475 (1989).
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4. The MIVElpis and M/VMaitland
The fall of 1989 was a treacherous season for the coral reefs of the Key
Largo National Marine Sanctuary. On October 25, 1989, the 155-foot oil
field supply vessel MIVAleck Owen Maitland ran hard aground on shallow
sanctuary reefs south of Carysfort Reef."8 Most of the coral colonies, and
several sponges and seafans were destroyed by the grounding and subse-
quent efforts to free the vessel. 9
In an unrelated accident, a second grounding occurred on November 11,
1989 on Elbow Reef, part of the same reef system that was damaged by the
Maitland grounding. 220 The MIVElpis, a 143-meter freighter ran aground,
causing "significant injury.,22' The propellers of the vessel created two large
craters, and the hard grounding of the hull created a substantial amount of
rubble and debris.
In the immediate aftermath, NOAA conducted an ecological survey of
the grounding sites, which later formed the basis for a successful natural
resource damage claim under the NMSA. The two cases were settled out of
court in 1991 and over $3 million in funds were recovered and used to offset
response and restoration costs. 222 The damage sustained by the reef was so
severe that it was necessary to first repair the underlying framework before
commencing ecological recovery efforts.223
Known as the Elpis/Maitland Restoration Project, the two-phased project
did not begin until July of 1995. The first phases included efforts to recreate
218. "Maitland Coral Reef Restoration," NOAA Web Site (visited May 1, 1998)
<http://www-orca.nos.noaa.gov/darp/seregion/maitland.htm>; "Florida Keys National Marine
Sanctuary, Coral Reef Restoration," NOAA Web Site (visited May 2, 1998)
<http://www.nos.noaa.gov/nmsp/fknms/resto/resto.html>; "Coral Reef Restoration to Begin
in Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary at Maitland and Elpis Grounding Sites," NOAA
Web Site, NOAA 95-R4 10 (visited May 2, 1998) <http://www.noa.gov/public-affairs/pr95
/may95/reef.html>.
219. Id. The vessel caused a large crater, threatening surrounding, unendangered reefs.
See id.
220. "Elpis Coral Reef Restoration," NOAA Web Site (visited May 1, 1998) <http://
www-orca.nos.noaa.gov/darp/seregion/elpis.htm>; "Coral Reef Restoration to Begin in
Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary at Maitland and Elpis Grounding Sites," NOAA
Web Site, NOAA 95-R410 (visited May 2, 1998) <http://www.noa.gov/publicaffairs/pr95/
may95/reef.html>.
221. Id.
222. "Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary, Coral Reef Restoration," NOAA Web
Site (visited May 2, 1998) <http://www.nos.noaa.gov/nmsp/fknms/resto/resto.html>; D.
James Baker, "Memorandum for the Secretary," NOAA Weekly Report for June 20, 1995
(visited May 2, 1998) <http://oar31.oar.noaa.gov/Weekly/I995/95 06 20.txt>.
223. "Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary, Coral Reef Restoration," NOAA Web
Site (visited May 2, 1998) <http://www.nos.noaa.gov/nmsp/fknms/resto/resto.html>.
the overall physical structure of the coral surface.224 It is hoped that the
second, ongoing phase will enhance natural recovery rates and "provide
unique scientific insight into the fundamental relationships between habitat
structure and the ecology and management of coral reef environments." 5
Continuing restoration efforts will include transplanting corals, sea fans and
sponges in hopes of accelerating the natural rate of recovery. 26
5. The M/VMiss Beholden
In March of 1993, the 147-foot long Grenadian flag freighter, M/VMiss
Beholden, ran aground the Western Sambo Reef within the FKNMS. 7 The
Coast Guard brought an action against the vessel, seeking damages under the
NMSA.228 Under the NMSA, "any person who destroys, causes the loss of
or injures any sanctuary resource is liable to the United States for response
costs and damages resulting from such destruction, loss or injury. '229 The
vessel intentionally ran aground upon the reef to avoid sinking. The court
ruled that the resulting destruction of over 1,000 square meters of live coral
and 133.5 meters of established reef framework was not "negligible" so as
to permit the vessel to avoid liability.230
Addressing a question of first impression the district court held that the
strict liability interpretation of CERCLA and the CWA should be extended
to the NMSA.2' Thus, defendants are subject to liability for the damages
they cause unless they can successfully assert an appropriate defense. The
NMSA explicitly sets forth three available defenses:
A person is not liable under this subsection if that person establishes
that-
(A) the destruction or loss of, or injury to, the sanctuary
resource was caused solely by an act of God, an act of war,
224. See Coral ReefRestoration to Begin in Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary at
Maitland and Elpis Grounding Sites (visited May 2, 1998) <http://www.noaa.gov/public-
affairs/pr95/may95reef.html>.
225. Id.
226. Id. Physical restoration at the Maitland site entailed placing series of "reef
modules"-- 10 ton concrete slabs with upper surfaces textured to resemble those of living
reefs - into the craters. At the Elpis site, limestone boulders were used to fill the craters.
See NOAA, State of the Coast <http://state-of-coast.noaa.gov/bulletins/html/chr_10/case.
html>.
227. United States v. M/VMiss Beholden, 856 F. Supp. 668 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
228. See id.
229. National Marine Sanctuaries Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1443(a)(1) (1994).
230. See United States v. M/VMiss Beholden, 856 F. Supp. at 671.
231. See id. at 670.
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or an act or omission of a third party, and the person acted
with due care; (B) the destruction, loss or injury was caused
by an activity authorized by federal or state law; or (C) the
destruction, loss, or injury was negligible.22
Upon the defendant's failure to establish an appropriate defense, the court
ruled that the defendant knew or should have known that severe weather
conditions were expected on the day of the grounding.233 Specifically, the
court noted that weather forecasts as early as two days prior to the grounding
issued gale warnings and a tornado watch for the area surrounding the
Florida Keys.234
6. The R/V Columbus Iselin
On November 22, 1997, NOAA and the University of Miami settled a
civil claim for damages arising from grounding of the R/V Columbus Iselin
in the Looe Key National Marine Sanctuary, now part of the FKNMS. The
ship ran hard aground on the western portion of Looe Key on August 10,
1994, and remained there for two days while Coast Guard and NOAA
officials worked to remove the vessel.2 35 The grounding injured one of the
best developed spur and groove formations within the FKNMS. In addition,
large numbers of corals, sponges, and sea fans were either killed or displaced
from the reef.2
36
Pursuant to section 312 of the NMSA, NOAA sought damages for injury
to sanctuary resources, civil penalties, response costs, and forfeiture. The
settlement agreement provides for a cash payment of $2.9 million to pay for
"the implementation of restoration, monitoring, damage assessment costs,
compensatory restoration for interim losses of sanctuary resources,
permitting and environmental compliance costs." '237 In addition, the
University had already made payments to NOAA in the amount of:
$200,000 in civil penalties; $260,147.37 for response and damage assess-
232. 16 U.S.C. § 1443(a)(3).
233. See United States v. M/VMiss Beholden, 856 F. Supp. at 670. The court specifically
found: "Given the similarities between the liability provisions of these statutes and the
NMSA, the Court finds that the strict liability interpretation of CERCLA and FWPCA should
be extended to NMSA."
234. See id.
235. See NOAA Gears up for Reef Restoration at Looe Key (visited Dec. 2, 1997)
<http://www/enn.com/enn-news-archive/1997/12/120297/12029710.asp>.
236. See id.
237. See id.
ment costs; and $600,000 for restoration planning. 3 8 NOAA will use the
funds to implement a coral restoration plan for the impact site, to support the
development and application of new technologies to address damaged reefs,
and to prevent future groundings in the sanctuary. 9
7. The C/VHouston
On February 2, 1997, the 400 foot container ship Contship Houston
apparently lost its way and ran aground on North America's only living coral
reef, known as Maryland Shoals.240 The reef is the world's third largest reef,
attracting more than 1.5 million people a year to the Florida Keys.241 The
vessel was more than two miles within the well marked boundaries of the
FKNMS, approximately twelve miles southeast of Key West, Florida.242
The vessel was carrying 2,53 0 megatons of heavy fuel oil, 153 megatons
of diesel oil, and 134 megatons of lube oil.243 While removing the vessel, the
clear threat ofpollution was a major concern. Salvers wanted to "ensure that
the ship was safely refloated without impacting the reef while also paying
close attention to the ship's condition." 244  Fortunately, the ship was
successfully refloated on February 8, after a partial defueling and a
deballasting sequence.14' Had the reefbeen rocky, the grounding could have
resulted in an environmental disaster.
Following an investigation, the Coast Guard determined that the ship's
grounding was caused by human error. The crew failed to adhere to sound
238. See Notice of Settlement Agreement, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,360 (1997).
239. NOAA plans to use the funds for structural and biological restoration of the
damaged reef; biological monitoring to evaluate the effectiveness of restoration measures
and design any necessary mid-course corrections; off-site compensatory restoration designed
to enhance the long-term health of the reefs and minimize the risk of future vessel
groundings; and project management and oversight. See id.
240. See Freighter aground on coral reef off Florida Keys (visited Feb. 3, 1997)
<http:/europe.cnn.conVEARTH/9606/05/reef.rebuilding/index.html>. The Liberian-register-
ed vessel was en route to Spain from Houston, Texas when it ran aground. See id.; see also
Eddie Dominguez, 600-Foot Ship Grounded on Live Coral in National Sanctuary (visited
Feb. 4, 1997) <http://www.n-jcenter.conenviro/en204a.htm>.
241 See Eddie Dominguez, 600-foot Ship Grounded on Live Coral in National Sanctuary
(visited Feb. 4, 1997) <http:l/www.n-jcenter.conr/enviro/en204a.htm>.
242. See Stranding of Container Ship Houston (last modified Apr. 1,1997) <http://
www.navsea.navy.mil/seaO0c/doc/slight4.html>.
243. See id.
244. Id.
245. See id. Two new POSSE software feature were used for the first time in an actual
salvage operation by U.S. Navy engineers. The software enabled the engineers to better
estimate the magnitude and location of the ground reaction and to analyze the effects of
deballasting on ship strength and stability. See id.
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marine practices and the vessel had strayed from regular shipping channels,
in part due to plotting mistakes. 46 The owners of the ship, Transportation
Maritima Mexican, promised to pay up to $6 million to cover any settlement
or judgment in favor of the United States. 47 In response to the grounding,
which damaged a variety of coral over a two-mile stretch, the Sanctuary may
work with the Coast Guard to install signaling devices at lighthouses. 8
8. The M/VFortuna Reefer
On July 24, 1997, the 326-foot M/VFortuna Reefer grounded near a
Puerto Rico Natural Reserve off the west coast of Mona Island. The vessel's
hull injured a barrier reef populated by "old growth" elkorn corals. Due to
the remote location, salvage efforts took eight days. Fortunately, no
significant amount of oil was releaesd, but the total damaged area of reef
measured close to nine hundred feet in length, and fifty to one hundred feet
in width.249
On September 11, 1997, a settlement agreement was reached between
Rama Shipping Company of Thailand, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
and NOAA. The shipping company agreed to pay the Commonwealth and
NOAA $1.25 million: $650,000 for emergency restoration of broken corals
and $400,000 for compensatory restoration. Damage Assessment Restora-
tion Program(DARP) officials began emergency restoration of some 400
pieces of elkorn coral on September 20.250
9. Recreational Vessels
In July of 1985, a boater was charged with violating of a Key Largo
National Marine Sanctuary regulation which provided that "no anchor shall
be cast or dragged in such a way as to damage any coral reef formations.
Anchors shall be dropped only on sand flats off the reefs and will be placed
to avoid dragging into the coral formations. 2 51 NOAA sought a penalty of
246. See Human Error Caused ships Grounding, Damage to Coral Reef(visited Aug, 28,
1997) <http://www.n-jcenter.com/97/aug/28/en1.htm>.
247. See Grounded ship refloated, to be towed to Miami (visited Feb. 9, 1997)
<http://www.n-jcenter.com/enviro/en209b.htm>.
248. See Human Error CausedShip's Grounding, Damage to CoralReef supra note 246.
249 See Settlement Speeds Puerto Rico Coral Reef Repair (visited May 2, 1998)
<http://www.noaa.gov/public-affairs/pr97/oct97/noaa97-r417.html>.
250. See id. The goal of emergency restoration actions is to reverse the major impacts of
groundings by reestablishing the physical structure of the coral reef community, thereby
reducing coral mortality. See id.
251. 15 C.F.R. § 929.7(a)(6)(iii) (1989).
$300 against a boater who set his anchor in a sand pocket adjacent to corals.
A sanctuary officer observed that the anchor line was making contact with
coral formations. Although the agency made no specific finding of the
extent of damage, the ALJ stated that there was "simply no excuse" for
anchoring so close to the coral, and ordered that a civil penalty be assessed
in the amount of $3,000.52
NOAA may assess a civil penalty against a mariner even if the
grounding does not cause any meaureable damage to living coral. In 1991,
the operator of a vessel that ran aground at Molasses Reef was assessed the
minimum $450 penalty even though sanctuary officials found no apparent
damage. Although the vessel did not break or damage any living coral, the
regulations provide that damage to "any plant, soil, rock, or other
material" 3 also constitutes a violation. The damage need not be permanent
to establish a violation.z 4
D. NOAA 's Damage Assessment and Restoration Program
NOAA established the DARP to fulfill natural resource trustee
responsibilities assigned in the CWA, CERCLA, OPA 1990, and the NMSA.
The program's objective is to assess and restore coastal and marine natural
resources under its trusteeship that are injured by spills and chronic releases
of oil or hazardous materials and by vessel groundings in National Marine
Sanctuaries." Through this program, NOAA addresses injuries resulting
from long term releases of hazardous substances and oil spills, catastrophic
spills, and physical injury to National Marine Sanctuary resources resulting
from ship groundings and other anthropogenic disturbances. If injuries to
natural resources are not fully addressed during the immediate response to
an incident, DARP works in cooperation with other trustees and the
responsible parties to obtain adequate restoration of injured resources
through the damage assessment process.
Since NOAA established the program in 1991, DARP has settled and
begun restoration for more than two dozen natural resource damage
assessment cases. 6NOAA lists the benefits ofthe program as: "holding the
252. See In the Matter of Michael T. Sciarome, 4 O.R.W. 566, 567 (1986). All but $300
was suspended for a period of two years on the condition that the individual commit no
further violation of sanctuary provisions. See id.
253. 15 C.F.R. § 929.7(a)(1)(i).
254. See In the Matter of William A. Hanke, 6 O.R.W. 360, 362 (1991).
255. See Damage Assessment and Restoration Program (visited Jan. 25, 1998) <http:l/
www.orca.nos.noaa.gov/darp/about.htm>.
256. See AboutDARP (visited Jan. 25,1998) <http:lwww.orca.nos.noaa.gov/darp/about.
htm>.
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polluter responsible for harmful actions; leveraging taxpayer dollars for
environmental restoration; advancing the state of the art and integration of
environmental science, economics and law; and restoring injured coastal and
marine resources."
As the principle federal trustee for coastal and marine resources, NOAA
evaluated injuries resulting from the release of oil and hazardous substances,
as well as injuries to resources within National Marine Sanctuaries caused
by disturbances such as ship groundings and anchorings. The Damage
Assessment Center ofNOAA's Office of Ocean Resources Conservation and
Assessment conducts natural resource damage assessments to support claims
against potentially responsible parties, and provides the technical basis for
the Department of Justice's litigation of natural resource damage claims.257
The three-step damage assessment and restoration process involves pre-
assessment, restoration planning and restoration implementation. In the first
step, NOAA and other trustees evaluate the level of injury sustained by the
resource and determine whether response actions will effectively eliminate
the threat of ongoing injury. Next, the trustees fully assess the nature and
extent of the injuries and then select a preferred restoration action from a
reasonable range of alternatives. In the final step, the trustees work with the
responsible parties to design and implement the selected restoration actions.
Restoration plans are subject to public comment prior to implementation.
Once the level of environmental damage has been determined, officials
prepare a restoration plan outlining the viable restoration options and form
the basis for assessing restoration fees, as well as an immediate remedial
action plan, usually implemented within a month after the grounding. A
primary goal of restoration is to accelerate the rate of natural recovery.
Restoration efforts typically include: stabilization ofreef surfaces, reinforce-
ment of the structure, recreation of lost habitat complexity, recreation of
aesthetics, and transplantation and reintroduction of corals and other
dominant organisms.5
Funds for restoration projects are generated from fines assessed against
negligent vessel operators. In a recent settlement, the U.S. Navy paid
$750,000 to the State of Florida and the Broward County Department of
Natural Resources Protection for damages caused by a submarine grounding.
More than 1,200 square meters of reef were damaged or destroyed. Broward
257. See Damage Assessment Center (visited May 2, 2998) <http://www.nos.noaa.gov/
factslorca/dac/>. The center also reviews federal laws and regulationos addressing damage
assessment and makes recommendations for improved effectiveness of trustees. See id. The
center was established in response to the Exxon Valdez spill. See id.
258. GEOTIMES, supra note 6, at 19.
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County is utilizing the settlement monies to design and implement a
restoration strategy.29
V. CONCLUSION
Federal agencies like NOAA act as stewards of natural resources on
behalf of the public. In fulfilling their trust responsibilities to affected
communities, the trustees typically seek both primary restoration and
compensatory restoration. The aim of primary restoration is to return natural
resources to the condition that would have existed but for the release of a
hazardous substance, while compensatory restoration efforts attempt to
restore the natural resource services and amenities that communities lose
from the time of the release until the completion of primary restoration.
In its approach to natural resource damages, NOAA's focus has shifted
away from litigation over monetized damage claims to restoration planning.
Existing law authorizes natural resource trustees to recover full compensa-
tion for the public's interim loss of resource services from the moment that
a natural resource is injured by a hazardous substance release until the date
the resource fully recovers. Trustees may consider nonuse values when
determining restoration projects that compensate for interim losses.26
Nonuse values are perhaps most significant whenever a unique resource is
injured or destroyed. In such cases, trustees may prefer to undertake
compensatory restoration projects that improve the level of other resource
services available to the public if the improvements are commensurate with
the losses.
Failure on the part of trustees to consider the total value of the resources
(use value and nonuse values) could result in the selection of projects that
significantly under-compensate the public. This could create an incentive
for the responsible parties to take fewer precautions in pristine areas, where
human use is low, than in already degraded areas, where human use is
considerably higher.
259. See id. at I8
260. Economic theory can determine use values where there is no established market
value for the injured resource. Many experts assert that natural resources have value beyond
theirusevalue. These nonuse values include existence value and intrinsic value. Existence
value can be divided into three components: the value ofpreserving a resource for future use
("option value"), the value of knowing that a resource is protected ("vicarious value"), and
the value of preserving a resource for future generations ("intertemporal value"). The
intrinsic value of a resource is its inherent worth, independent of human use. See Charles B.
Anderson, Damage to Natural Resources and the Costs of Restoration, 72 TULANE L. REV.
417,424 (1987).
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The current regulations pertaining to recovery of natural resource
damages are seriously flawed and in need of reform. Despite the good
intentions of DOI and NOAA in balancing the mandates of CERCLA and
OPA, the judicial constraints of the Ohio decision, and widespread criticism,
the current natural resource damage assessment process is unsatisfactory and
will likely remain so without legislative reform mandating the use of reliable
scientific standards and techniques for measuring such damages.
To date, restoration efforts have largely been guided by legal precedent
rather than science. According to one expert, there is a "general lack of
quantitative descriptions of the ecological effects of ship groundings on coral
reefs and an even greater lack of data describing the direction and rate of
natural reef recovery., 261 A recent study of ship grounding sites within the
FKNMS found that reef ecosystems do not recover from ship groundings
without intervention and manipulation.262
Restoration efforts can be hampered by drawn out litigation. In some
instances, grounding sites are not restored until the parties reach a settlement
or the court forces the responsible parties to pay the assessed fines.
Fortunately, NOAA's Damage Assessment and Restoration Program
provides a single focus within NOAA for natural resource damage assess-
ment and restoration. The program's cooperative approach has proven
effective. Protracted and costly litigation is often avoided because NOAA,
other trustees, and the responsible parties are given an opportunity to agree
to a settlement that restores injured natural resources.
261. GEOTIMES, supra note 6, at 17.
262. See id.
